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Abstract 
 
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interrelationship that exists between the evolution of 
the Emerging Markets Bonds Index (EMBI) and some macroeconomic variables in seven Latin 
American countries; two of them (Ecuador and Panama), full dollarized. We make use of a 
Cointegrated Vector framework to analyse the short run effects from 2001 to 2009. The results 
suggest that EMBI is more stable in dollarized countries and that its evolution influences economic 
activity in non-dollarized economies; suggesting that investors’ confidence might be higher in 
dollarized countries where real and financial economic evolution are less vulnerable to external 
shocks than in non-dollarized ones. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 had a much smaller impact on 
emerging Latin American markets than on their US and European counterparts. While 
Latin American countries have continued to grow and do not present major 
macroeconomic imbalances, the advanced economies still do not present solid recovery 
(Figures 1 and 2 jointly with Tables 1 and 2, in Annex 1, show the evolution of GDP 
growth and of the government-debt-to-GDP ratio in the two groups of countries). The 
marginal exposure of banks in emerging markets to US subprime assets and their 
governments’ expansive monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate aggregate demand might 
explain these differences (see Aizenman et al. 2013). However, some authors have analysed 
whether exchange rate regimes have played a part1.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
This paper has two main objectives. The first is to empirically investigate the role of 
fundamentals in the reduced vulnerability to shocks observed in the bond markets of seven 
Latin American countries, and how this reduced vulnerability has in turn affected 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The second is to determine whether there are any 
differences between countries that can be attributed to their exchange rate regime. 
Specifically, we aim to compare countries with and without a fully-dollarized economy. To 
this end, we empirically assess the relationship between key economic factors such as the 
external debt-to-exports ratio and inflation, and the Emerging Markets Bonds Index 
(EMBI)2 during the sample period 2001-2009. In the second stage of the study, we aim to 
                                                            
1
The results are not conclusive, though. Whilst Krugman (2013) shows how Eurozone members have had more trouble managing 
their debts than countries outside it, Rose (2013) suggests that the exchange rate regime does not matter.  
2
The JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bonds Index Global tracks total returns for traded external debt instruments in emerging 
markets. The EMBI Global includes US dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans, and Eurobonds with an outstanding face value of at 
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establish whether there are relevant differences in the two groups of countries (dollarized 
and non-dollarized economies). 
A review of the empirical literature shows that our first question has usually been 
approached through an analysis of the main determinants of country risk premium3. For 
instance, Edwards (1986) uses data on yields of 167 bonds floated by 13 Least Developed 
Countries (LDC) between 1976 and 1980 to analyse the factors that determine the country 
risk premium. He presents evidence that bond spreads depend positively on the countries’ 
level of indebtedness and negatively on the level of investment they undertake. Nogués and 
Grandes (2001), focusing on monthly data for Argentina between 1994 and 1998 and 
estimating its econometric model by OLS, conclude that endogenous factors such as the 
external debt-to-exports ratio, the fiscal deficit, growth expectations, contagion effects or 
political noise are the determinants of Argentina’s country risk. Rozada and Levy Yeyati 
(2008), however, estimating panel error-correction models of emerging spreads on high-
yield corporate bonds in developed markets and international rates (US Treasury bills) and 
using high frequency (monthly, weekly and daily) data from 33 emerging economies, find 
that global (exogenous) factors explain over 50 per cent of the long run volatility of 
emerging market spreads.  
To sum up, the country risk premium has generally been proxied in the literature by 
sovereign spreads. Specifically, the spread of JP Morgan’s EMBI Global index over US 
Treasuries bills in Latin America countries is the most important reference for prospective 
investors in this area. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
least $500 million. Daily historical index levels have been reported since December 31, 1993. See JP Morgan (1999) for more 
details.  
3
Country risk refers to the likelihood that a sovereign state (borrower) may be unable and/or unwilling to meet its obligations 
towards foreign lenders and/or investors (Krayenbuehl 1985). 
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The research so far on the determinants of country risk can be classified in three groups4. 
First, certain authors have found a significant correlation between macroeconomic-political 
variables and the risk premium (Hoti and McAller 2004; Baldacci et al. 2008; Aizenman et 
al. 2013). Authors in the second group have emphasized the effect of exogenous factors 
(global factors, contagion effects, capital flows or “investor’s sentiment”) on risk premium 
(Eichengreen and Mody 1998; Kamin and von Kleist 1999; Schuknecht et al. 2009, 2010). 
Finally, authors in the third group relate country risk and the exchange rate regime. They 
consider that investors want to know two major components of country risk premium: the 
currency premium, which can be measured as the yield spread between non-dollar-
denominated and US dollar-denominated sovereign debt of the same borrowing country, 
and the credit premium, measured as the yield spread between the dollar-denominated 
sovereign debt of the emerging country and US Treasury bills. There is a certain consensus 
inside the third group of authors that dollarization and hard pegs would substantially 
reduce the country risk of emerging countries (Domowitz et al. 1998; Rubinstein 1999; 
Schmukler 2002). 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this branch of the literature by examining the 
impact of macroeconomic fundamentals on risk premium and vice versa, since movements 
in government bond yields may have significant macroeconomic consequences, (see 
Caceres et al. 2010). 
The literature on the determinants of EMBI in specific Latin American countries is still 
scarce. Fracasso (2007), a good reference for Brazil (he shows that foreign investors’ 
appetite for risk impacts substantially on EMBI spreads)5; Nogués and Grandes (2001) for 
Argentina, who highlight that devaluation risk elimination may not have a statistically 
                                                            
4
The literature on country risk is essentially four decades old. The two pioneering articles were published by Frank and Cline (1971) 
and Feder and Just (1977). Since then, authors have attempted to establish the determinants and the econometric criteria to estimate, 
evaluate, and forecast country risk in different economies. 
5
In financial jargon, the investors’ degree of risk aversion is usually called “investor appetite for risk”. 
 
 
5 
 
significant impact on country risk (other macroeconomic variables such as the external 
debt-to-exports ratio and growth expectations present a higher impact); Vargas et al. 
(2012), for Colombia, who present evidence that improvement of fiscal variables reduces 
the sovereign risk premium; Herrera et al. (2013) for Mexico, who find long-run 
relationships between domestic macroeconomic variables and the Mexican EMBI; Lindao 
Jurado et al. (2009) for Ecuador who conclude that debt and the inflation are the most 
important factors for explaining its country risk; Délano and Selaive (2005), who examine 
Chilean’s EMBI behaviour and conclude that approximately 25% of the variability of the 
sovereign spread is due to global factors, and finally the IMF (2010) which emphasizes that 
achieving investment grade lowers Panamanian debt spreads by over 140 basis points.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework 
while Section 3 outlines the data and the econometric model used in the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 reports the main empirical results, comparing dollarized and non-dollarized 
countries. Finally, Section 5 presents the main conclusions.  
2. Country risk and EMBI determinants 
2.1. The equilibrium condition for a risk-neutral lender 
Following Edwards (1986), in an emerging or developing country that cannot affect the 
world interest rate, the cost of external funds is formed by two concepts: (1) the risk-free 
world interest rate (i*) and (2) a country risk premium (s) related to the probability of 
default perceived by the lender (p). In the case of a one-period loan, where in case of 
default the lender loses both the principal and the interest, the equilibrium condition for a 
risk-neutral lender is: 
                                      (1-p)[1+i*+s] = (1+i*)                                                              (1)                                 
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From here, the country risk premium is: 
                                      s= (p/(1-p))k                                                                              (2)                                                                                                               
where k= 1+i*. 
Since the probability of default depends positively on the debt-to-GDP ratio, as the 
seminal article by Eaton and Gersowitz (1989) demonstrated, the country then faces an 
upwards-sloping supply curve for foreign funds. As the probability of default approaches 
one, the country risk premium approaches infinity and a credit ceiling will be reached. The 
country in question will have difficulties gaining access to the world’s credit market. If the 
variables that comprise the probability of default perceived by lenders were known, the 
countries might be able to improve them in order to reduce it to zero.  
According to Edwards (1986), p has the following logistic function: 
                p = (exp ∑βiXi)/(1+exp∑βiXi)                                                                   (3)                                                                
where Xi  are the determinants of the sovereign risk premium and βi  are the corresponding 
coefficients. Combining (2) and (3), taking logarithms and adding a random disturbance ε, 
the equation to be estimated is: 
                log s= log k + ∑βiXi + ε                                                                           (4) 
The signs of this equation change slightly if the model is described in terms of returns. 
Transforming equation (1), we obtain:  
              (1-p)[1+r*-s] = (1+r*)                                                                                 (5)                                                                                   
where r* is the risk-free world return and s represents, this time, the reduction in terms of 
return on the bond investment, and k*=1+r*. Our equation (4) then only changes the 
signs:  
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              log s =  log k* + ∑βiXi + ε                                                                          (6)                                                                                                                                                     
Moving terms, we obtain the emerging country return depending on the same determinants 
of country risk: 
        log s - log k* = ∑βiXi + ε                                                                             (7) 
2.2. Determinants of each country return index 
Both theoretical and empirical studies have highlighted a large number of variables that 
may affect the evolution of government debt returns in emerging countries6. We can split 
these variables into three groups: economic-financial, socio-political, and global factors. 
Table 3 in Annex 2 details some of the variables used in the empirical literature by a wide 
range of authors to explain the determinants of government debt returns in emerging 
countries, whilst Table 4 describes the variables used in our model.  
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
3. Data and empirical approach 
3.1. Data and variables 
Table 4 in Annex 2 provides the description of the variables along with the data sources.  
We included four endogenous variables in our econometric model. The EMBI (with its 
monthly average calculated from daily data, in order to eliminate its heteroscedasticity and 
because the rest of variables are available at this frequency), along with variables that are 
only reported monthly, such as the Economic Activity Index (eai). This variable was used 
to measure the growth perspective in the case of Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador, while 
the growth perspective was proxied by the Industrial Activity Index (iai) in Mexico, the 
Industrial Index (ii) in Brazil, the Industrial Production Index (ipi) in Chile and, finally, the 
                                                            
6
See Hoti and McAller (2004) and Maltritz and Molchanov (2013), which present a summary of the explanatory variables and 
econometric models used in previously published empirical articles. 
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revenues from taxes to cross the Canal in the case of Panama7. In Panama we used this 
variable because all the other sectors of its economy depend on Canal activities, as do other 
markets such as the labour market. The other monthly variables are the inflation rate (inf), 
which was has been calculated from the Consumer Price Index in all the countries, except 
in Ecuador where it was directly recorded, and the external debt-to-exports ratio (debt_x), 
which captures the current account solvency of emerging countries.  
The impact of global risk factors will be captured through the inclusion of dummies.  
3.2. Econometric approach: Identification of the short run structure in the 
Cointegrated VAR (CVAR) 
Consider the Cointegrated VAR model in the so-called reduced form representation: 
∆xt = Г1∆xt-1 + αβ
´xt-1 + ΦDt + εt ,                                  εt ~ IN(0, Ω)                        (8) 
Pre-multiplying (8) with a non-singular p x p matrix A0, we obtain the so-called structural 
form representation: 
A0∆xt = A1∆xt-1 + aβ
´xt-1 + A0ΦDt + vt ,                          vt ~ INp(0, Σ)                       (9)    
where A1=A0Г1, a=A0α, vt=A0εt 
The short run equations consist of p equations between p current variables, ∆xt, p(k-1) 
lagged variables (∆xt-i  i=1….,k-1), and r lagged equilibrium errors, (β
c)´xt-1. Identification of 
the r long run relationships requires at least r-1 restrictions on each relationship, while 
identification of the simultaneous short run structure of the p equations requires at least p-
1 restrictions on each equation.  
                                                            
7
 The Economic Activity Index for Argentina, Ecuador and Colombia is presented as the monthly proxy of GDP by their respective 
National Statistic Institutes. In the case of Mexico we use the Industrial Activity Index instead of the Global Economic Activity 
Index because the latter, not only does not include all the sectors of the economy, but also is still a preliminary variable that is being 
adjusted by private and public enterprises over time. Indeed, in Mexico, the Industrial Index has historically been used as a proxy of 
GDP because their strong co-movements (OECD 2012). Brazil and Chile models include the Industrial Index as well, but this time 
the reason is data availability constraint.    
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Keeping the properly identified cointegrating relationships fixed at their estimated values, 
i.e. by treating (βc)´xt-1  as predetermined stationary regressors, as in the case of ∆xt-i, it is 
easier to identify the simultaneous short run structure. We identify the long run 
relationships first, and then the short run adjustment parameters. 
The unrestricted short run reduced form model is identified exactly by the p-1 zero 
restrictions on each row of A0=I. Further zero restrictions on Г1, α and Φ are over-
identifying. Thus, the process of identification consists firstly in individually testing 
whether all lagged variables, the long run structure, and dummy variables are statistically 
significant in the system. The next step is to remove the non-significant variables from the 
system, so that the generally identified model only contains significant coefficients. The 
significant coefficients will identify the short run adjustment parameters and the long run 
relationships that affect the dependent variables of our simultaneous equations system 
which is estimated by maximum likelihood8.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Econometric steps 
First, we estimated an unrestricted VAR for each country with the following structure: 
Xt=[EMBI, eai, inf, debt_x]. Previously, all the variables were transformed into logarithms 
except inflation; recall from section 3.1 that the variable capturing the growth expectations 
(eai) changes depending on the country in question. Second, we carried out the residual 
analysis shown properly in Table 5 in Annex 3.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Here we detail the dummies included for each country: 
                                                            
8
This section relies heavily on Juselius (2006).  
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Argentina: The dummy dum0111p (2001:11) takes into account the significant fall in the 
Global EMBI due to the currency crisis sparked by Argentina’s abandoning of the currency 
board, following public debt default9. Dum0202p and dum0204p variables capture the 
consequences of devaluation that generated inflation pressures (ECLAC, 2002). The 
dum0504p was included to normalize debt_x residuals since at that date external debt 
experienced a sharp decrease when Argentina launched a debt exchange in 200510. Brazil: 
dum0211p is included to normalize the debt_x residuals. After the 1999 devaluation on the 
public debt denominated in US dollars, Brazil’s debt increased substantially, reaching 50% 
of total public debt at the end of 200211. Colombia: The objective of dum0405p is to 
normalize the EMBI residuals; three dummies dum0901p, dum0904p and dum0907p 
represent the impact of the 2008-2009 global crisis on Colombia’s economic activity 
(ECLAC, 2009). Chile: dum0405p which normalizes the EMBI residuals and the 
dum0901p which normalizes the economic activity variable (ipi) are incorporated in the 
analysis. Mexico: dum0405p is also included in order to eliminate the outliers of the 
EMBI’s residuals. Ecuador: Five permanent dummies need to be included. Whilst 
dum0906p is related to Ecuador default in 200912, dum0811p is introduced to jointly 
explain the debt_x and the EMBI evolution. The rest of dummies are dum0109p and 
dum0301p which are needed to normalize inflation residuals13. Panama: The dum0401p 
normalizes residuals of inflation. Prices decreased in the first quarter of 2004, but the trend 
reverted afterward due to the rise in oil prices and other import products (ECLAC 2004).   
The dum0810p (along with dum0811p only for Ecuador) is common to all the endogenous 
variables since it is related to the start of the world financial crisis (the US financial 
                                                            
9
In April 1991 the Convertibility Plan was launched, which pegged the peso 1-to-1 to the US dollar. This plan was replaced with a 
dual exchange rate regime based on an official exchange rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar for public sector and tradable transactions, 
while other transactions were conducted at market rates. By June 2002 the exchange rate reached 4 pesos per dollar (Kaminsky et al. 
2009 and Mourelle 2010). 
10
See Hornbeck (2013). 
11
See Giambiagi and Ronci (2004). 
12
In June 2009 the Correa government defaulted on $3.2 billion of foreign public debt, and then completed a buyback of 91 per cent 
of the defaulted bonds (Sandoval 2009).  
13
 Inflation only achieved a stable level in Ecuador after the first quarter of 2003.  
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institution Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008 and affected the EMBI 
evolution of all emerging countries included in this study).  Dummies such as dum0405p 
and dum0901p might explain contagion effects between Chile, Colombia and Mexico14. 
Dum0405p captures the incidence of global factors such as a fall in international interest 
rates, which we can proxy using the US Treasury 10-year yield15 (Fig. 3 in Annex 1 shows 
that Treasury bonds yields went down in 2004:05).  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Following Eichengreen and Mody (1998), we assume that the relationship between the US 
Treasury bond rates and emerging bond prices is explained in terms of demand16. On the 
demand side, when Treasury bonds rates go up (their prices go down), there will be a 
tendency among investors to substitute emerging bonds by US Treasury bonds, and so the 
EMBI price falls. Finally, dummy dum0901p represents the vulnerability of Chile and 
Colombia with respect to the other countries included in the sample during the global 
economic crisis of 2008-2009.  
Third, we determined the rank of cointegration; Table 6 in Annex 3 shows the results of 
Johansen’s (1996) test, which concludes that all the countries reflect the presence of just 
one cointegrated vector; so the rank of their long run matrix is equal to 1 (with the 
exception of Panama, which matrix’s rank is 2).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Fourth, we test and impose over-identifying restrictions on the long run structure (beta 
vectors) in order to have only significant coefficients. Table 7 in Annex 3 shows the tests 
                                                            
14
Several articles have presented empirical evidence of contagion effects within these countries. For instance, based on the 
estimation of a multivariate regression model, Mathur et al. (2002) conclude that there were spillover contagion effects from the 
Mexican market to the Chilean market during the 1994 peso crisis. Moreover, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) study whether 
capital controls affect the link between domestic and foreign stock market prices and interest rates, and find that equity prices are 
more internationally linked than interest rates.  
15
McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) find high correlations of common factors with S&P500, US Treasury yield curve and oil prices.  
16
On the supply side, when Treasury bond rates go up, the increased debt servicing cost decreases the supply of US external debt. 
This in turn increases the price of emerging bonds averaged by the EMBI. 
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of exclusion for the seven countries, and Table 8 in the same Annex displays the final 
cointegration relationships for each of the countries. These long run relationships will be 
added as another predetermined variable into the simultaneous equation system and, along 
with dummies and lagged differenced variables, we will test whether their coefficients are 
significant or not17.  
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 here] 
Finally as a fifth step, we test the CVAR model as a simultaneous equation system. Its 
results are summarized in Tables 9a to 9g in Annex 4. We present the significance of the t-
values for the different coefficients in order to highlight the differences between the 
countries18 – specifically, between dollarized and non-dollarized countries.  
[Insert Tables 9 here] 
4.2. Interpretation of the results 
As mentioned, the results of the parameter estimations that describe the short run effects 
over variables are presented in Tables 9a to 9g in Annex 4. Specifically, Tables 9a to 9e 
correspond to non-dollarized countries and Tables 9f and 9g to the dollarized ones 
(Ecuador and Panama). In these tables, the presence of t-values makes it easy to distinguish 
between significant and non-significant coefficients across the seven emerging countries in 
the sample.  
Table 10 in Annex 4 presents the comparative analysis of the seven emerging countries.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Looking across the columns in Tables 9a to 9g in Annex 4, the following conclusions can 
be drawn: (1) The Emerging Bond Market Index (EMBI) is generally affected by global 
                                                            
17
The first four steps were performed using the software CATS. Recursive estimation to check parameters stability is available 
under request.  
18
This econometric work was carried out with the software Ox Metrics.  
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factors (proxied by dum0810p which captures the beginning of the financial crisis) and 
their own shocks, since all the countries in the sample, except Colombia, have a significant 
lagged DLEMBI coefficient in their EMBI equations. Debt_x does not seem to be relevant 
for explaining the EMBI behaviour, unless a country has defaulted on its debt obligations 
(as Ecuador did); (2) Economic activity is affected by the EMBI in all countries but 
dollarized ones; which represents the first important finding of this study, suggesting that 
in non-dollarized countries, debt-servicing costs may have an important impact on the 
evolution of the economy; (3) In most cases, inflation follows a long run relationship. In 
our opinion, this is the second important finding of this research, since it means that a 
country does not need to be dollarized to reach stable inflation levels. Inflation targeting 
might be behind the non-dollarized countries’ results19; (4) In general, investors look at the 
evolution of the EMBI to make their next decisions regarding sovereign bond debt 
investment. Colombia and Panama are the exceptions; (5) In general, the EMBI does not 
follow a long run relationship (with the exception of Mexico and Panama). (6) Finally, it 
seems that contagion effects are present in only three countries: Colombia, Chile, and 
Mexico. These inter-relationships are captured by dum0405p and dum0901p variables. The 
former affects the EMBI in the three countries, whilst the latter affects the economic 
activity in just the first two countries.  
5. Conclusions  
The two main findings of this paper are: (i) economic activity is affected by the EMBI in all 
the countries except the dollarized ones; and (ii) inflation follows a long run relationship 
for most of the sample (the exceptions being Colombia and Chile), showing that a country 
does not need to be dollarized to achieve a stable inflation level. Our results suggest that in 
                                                            
19
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) analyze the experience of Latin America countries with inflation targeting regimes and classify 
Brazil and Chile as full-fledged inflation targeting, whilst Colombia and Mexico are classified as partial inflation targeting regimes. 
These authors emphasize the substantial progress of these countries to achieve low one digit inflation levels without output 
sacrifices. 
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Latin America countries the pricing of risk (EMBI) depends mostly on global factors. 
Nevertheless, its evolution affects foreign lenders’ prospective debt investments, as well as 
domestic economic activity, except in dollarized countries.  
These results may suggest the following conclusions. First, dollarization may ensure that 
currency mismatches will not occur during domestic economic crises; thus, the EMBI is 
more stable and these countries’ access to debt markets is easier due to their lower 
vulnerability to EMBI shocks. Second, dollarized countries are not as dependent on 
international reserves (they use the US dollar both to develop their economies and to pay 
their debts), as their non-dollarized counterparts which need international reserves to pay 
their debts but use national currencies to develop their economies. This comparative 
analysis between two dollarized and five non-dollarized countries suggests that 
dollarization may isolate the evolution of the broadest emerging market debt benchmark, 
the EMBI. These results are particularly interesting since there are some non-dollarized 
Latin American countries which are already doing (relatively) well on their own. We think 
that they should encourage fiscal discipline in order to avoid a debt crisis situation since, in 
a default context, due to the interrelationship between their economic activity and the 
EMBI evolution; they would face much more trouble than dollarized economies. 
Besides, our results also suggest that in the long run, non-dollarized countries with inflation 
targeting policies achieve similar levels of inflation to those obtained by their dollarized 
counterparts. This result is consistent with those presented by other authors (Bernanke and 
Mishkin 1997; Bernanke 1999). The novelty is to reach this conclusion by means of the 
cointegrated VAR approach which identifies long-run relationships, including a stationary 
inflation variable in non-dollarized countries.  
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Annex 1: Latin American and developed countries evolution (2001-2010).  
 
Latin American countries’ evolution. 
 
Fig. 1. Total Central Government Debt-to-GDP ratio (%).  
 
 
 
Table 1. Annual GDP rate of growth. 
Year Argentina Brazil Colombia Chile Mexico Ecuador Panama 
        
2001 -4.45 1.31 1.71 3.35 -0.03 3.97 0.00 
2002 -10.84 2.65 2.48 2.19 0.77 4.11 2.40 
2003 8.76 1.15 3.91 3.92 1.39 2.82 4.68 
2004 9.03 5.71 5.34 6.03 4.21 8.24 7.46 
2005 9.18 3.15 4.71 5.60 3.07 5.32 6.94 
2006 8.51 3.95 6.68 4.58 4.97 4.33 8.44 
2007 8.65 6.09 6.90 4.53 3.22 2.07 12.57 
2008 6.71 5.17 3.59 3.67 1.37 6.33 10.10 
2009 0.86 -0.33 1.61 -0.99 -4.74 0.63 3.86 
2010 9.16 7.53 3.97 5.73 5.20 3.59 7.44 
2011 8.86 2.73 6.67 5.89 3.83 7.75 10.82 
2012 1.88 1.02 4.20 5.50 3.94 5.11 10.93 
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Evolution of the US and European countries.   
 
Fig. 2. Total Central Government Debt-to-GDP ratio (%).  
 
Table 2. Annual GDP rate of growth. 
 
Year Belgium France Greece Ireland Italy Portugal United States 
2001 0.80 1.83 4.19 4.98 1.86 1.97 0.94 
2002 1.35 0.92 3.43 5.41 0.45 0.76 1.77 
2003 0.80 0.89 5.94 3.72 -0.04 -0.91 2.79 
2004 3.27 2.54 4.36 4.19 1.73 1.56 3.79 
2005 1.75 1.82 2.28 6.08 0.93 0.77 3.35 
2006 2.66 2.46 5.50 5.50 2.19 1.44 2.66 
2007 2.88 2.28 3.53 4.97 1.68 2.36 1.78 
2008 0.98 -0.08 -0.21 -2.16 -1.15 -0.01 -0.29 
2009 -2.80 -3.14 -3.13 -6.38 -5.49 -2.90 -2.80 
2010 2.32 1.72 -4.94 -1.06 1.72 1.93 2.50 
2011 1.76 2.02 -7.10 2.16 0.47 -1.25 1.84 
2012 -0.13 0.01 -6.37 0.15 -2.53 -3.22 2.77 
 
 
Fig 3. US Treasury 10 year bond rate evolution (Monthly data 2001-2009) 
US Treasury bonds rate 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2
3
4
5
6
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Annex 2: Determinants of sovereign returns in emerging countries.  
 
Table 3. Variables used in the literature on sovereign returns' analysis in emerging 
countries. 
    
Economic and financial variables 
Variable Description/Authors 
 
 
Debt-to-GDP ratio 
The most important variable, since in most theoretical models of 
foreign borrowing it is included as an important triggering factor to 
borrowers to default (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Edwards, 1986, 
1986). It has also been included in empirical studies (Aizenman et 
al. 2013; Eichengreen and Mody, 1998).  
 
International reserves to 
GNP or GDP 
Measures the solvency held by a country. (See Edwards, 1986; 
Aizenman et al. 2013; and Rowland and Torres, 2004, to name a 
few). 
 
Investment-to-GNP/GDP 
ratio; GDP per capita 
growth;  Industrial 
production. 
These variables capture the country’s prospects for future growth. 
There are other variables used in the literature, though, such as the 
growth rate measured by the difference between the logs of GDP in 
time t and t-1. (See Nogués and Grandes, 2001; Edwards 1986 or  
Aizenman et al. 2013)  
Current account-to-
GNP/GDP ratio 
Solvency variables. (See Edwards, 1986; Nogués and Grandes, 
2001; or Aizenman et al. 2013). 
External debt service- to- 
exports ratio; External debt- 
to- GDP ratio;  External 
debt- to- exports. 
These variables capture the intertemporal liquidity situation of a 
country. (Edwards, 1986; Nogués and Grandes, 2001; Aizenman et 
al. 2013 and Rowland and Torres, 2004).  
Imports-to- GNP ratio; Trade 
openness (Exports plus 
Imports) % of GDP; Terms 
of trade  
These variables gauge the importance of trade. (See Edwards, 
1986; Aizenman et al. 2013; or Balacci et al. 2008) 
Index of real effective 
exchange rate 
See Edwards, 1986; or Rozada and Levy Yeyati, 2008.  
 
Fiscal balance- to- GDP ratio.  
This variable measures the country's fiscal sustainability. (See 
Nogués and Grandes, 2001; Rozada and Levy Yeyati, 2008; or 
Baldacci et al. 2008). 
Inflation rate See Baldacci et al. 2008; or Aizenman et al. 2013.  
 
 
 
Social and political variables 
Variable Description/Authors 
 
 
Political noise 
Nogués and Grandes (2001) focused on Argentina and tested the 
political noise associated with the resignation of the Minister 
Cavallo through a dummy variable that took the value 1 in the 
period of uncertainty that led to his resignation.  
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Global factors 
Variable Description/Authors 
 
External financial shocks 
Nogués and Grandes (2001) capture them using the rate of the 30-
year US Treasury bonds, whilst Rozada and Levy Yeyati (2008) 
use the 10-year US Treasury rate.   
 
 
 
 
 
Contagion effects 
They can be captured either by dummies or by variables such as 
other countries' returns. For instance, Nogues and Grandes (2001) 
included the JP Morgan Price index of Mexican bonds to measure 
its relationship with the country risk of Argentina. They expected 
that the historical similarities (in terms of economic policy and 
response to external shocks) between Mexico and Argentina would 
result in a similar behaviour of their governments' returns, beyond 
fundamental-based reasons.  
 
Market sentiment  
Diaz Weigel and Gemmill (2006) analyse a sample of emerging 
countries using variables such as US and regional stock returns or 
oil prices as proxies of global factors and market sentiment.  
 
 
  Table 4. Variables used in our comparative study.  
Variable Observations Source 
 
 
LEMBI_country 
Monthly average has been 
calculated from daily reported JP 
Morgan EMBI.   
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEAI, LIAI, LII, LIPI, LREV  
(These variables represent 
growth expectations. The 
variable used depends on data 
availability in each country). 
 
 
 
LEAI: Economic activity index in 
Argentina, Colombia and 
Ecuador.  
LIAI: Industrial activity index in 
Mexico.  
LII: Industrial Index in Brazil. 
LIPI: Industrial production index 
in Chile.  
LREV: Revenues from taxes 
levied in the Panama Canal.  
 
Argentina: Statistical National 
Institute (www.indec.mecon.ar) 
Brazil: Brazilian Statistical and 
Geographical Institute 
(www.ibge.gov.br) 
Colombia: Central Bank of 
Colombia Republic 
(www.banrep.gov.co) 
Chile: National Statistical 
Institute (www.ine.cl) 
Ecuador: Central Bank 
(www.bce.ec) 
Mexico: National Statistical and 
Geographical Institute (www. 
Inegi.org.mx) 
Panama: National Contraloria 
(www.contraloria.gob.pa)  
 
 
INF 
Inflation statistics in the case of 
Ecuador, but in the rest of the 
countries the difference in the 
Consumer Prices Index is used 
 
Ecuador: Central Bank  
Rest of countries: ECLAC.  
 
LDEBT_X 
 
External debt-to-exports ratio 
 
Economic Commission of the 
Latin American and Caribbean 
countries (ECLAC). 
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Annex 3. Preliminary tests.  
 
Table. 5. Residual Analysis 
Table 5a. Argentina 
Tests for Autocorrelation and lag length determination                            
          
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(k) 
VAR(2) 2 102 20 1060.174 -17.160 -18.385 0.582 
VAR(1) 1 102 16 1032.474 -17.343 -18.323 0.000 
 
Univariate Statistics                                                 
                                                 
 ARCH(2)                        Normality R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_ARG 3.732 [0.155]                5.806  [0.055] 0.697 
DLEAI 0.252 [0.881]   0.204  [0.903]                  0.945 
DINF    12.131 [0.002]                4.875  [0.087]                  0.852 
DLDEBT_X                   1.473 [0.479]               17.219  [0.000]                  0.416 
 
 
Table 5b.Brazil 
Tests for Autocorrelation and lag length determination                            
          
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(k) 
VAR(3) 3 102 13 1052.667     -18.283      -19.079    0.212 
VAR(2) 2 102 9 1031.318     -18.590      -19.141    0.031 
VAR(1) 1 102 5 1018.918     -19.072      -19.378    0.151 
 
Univariate Statistics                                                 
                                                 
 ARCH(3)               Normality R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_BRA 6.537 [0.088] 7.799  [0.020] 0.353 
DLII 0.337 [0.953]         0.048  [0.976]                0.417 
DINF 1.399 [0.706] 2.892  [0.236] 0.516 
DLDEBT_X                   5.180 [0.159]          1.851  [0.396] 0.336 
   
 
 Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_ARG      -0.000 0.052 -0.566 3.742 0.099 -0.170 
DLEAI 0.000 0.014 -0.070 2.927 0.033 -0.034 
DINF -0.000 0.211 0.300 3.808 0.698 -0.560 
DLDEBT_X                  0.000 0.064 0.103 4.942 0.190 -0.244 
  
 Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_BRA 0.000          0.039           -0.665              4.135          0.088              -0.115 
DLII -0.000          0.051           -0.034              2.850           0.128             -0.139 
DINF 0.000          0.144            0.168               3.523          0.384             -0.417 
DLDEBT_X               0.000          0.101           -0.100              3.359           0.268             -0.273 
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Table 5c. Colombia 
Tests for Autocorrelation and lag length determination                            
          
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(k) 
VAR(2) 2 102 20 946.132      -14.924      -16.149    0.722 
VAR(1) 1 102 16 909.039     -14.922     -15.902      0.000 
 
Univariate Statistics                                                 
                                                 
 ARCH(2)               Normality R-Squared 
DLEMBI_CO 2.497 [0.287]      5.191  [0.075]          0.501 
DLDEBT_X 1.316 [0.518]      2.178  [0.337]          0.553 
DLIMACO 1.075 [0.584]      9.972  [0.007]         0.887 
DINF 0.783 [0.676]       1.328  [0.515] 0.661 
  
 
Table 5d. Chile 
Tests for Autocorrelation and lag length determination                            
          
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(k) 
VAR(3) 3 102 24 1133.568     -17.874     -19.344       0.138 
VAR(2) 2 102 20 1107.698     -18.092     -19.317       0.004 
VAR(1) 1 102 16 1082.957     -18.332     -19.313       0.001 
 
Univariate Statistics                                                 
                                                 
 ARCH(3)               Normality R-Squared 
DLEMBI_CH 6.776 [0.079]          1.367  [0.505]              0.632 
DLIPI 1.186 [0.756]           0.389 [0.823]               0.858 
DINF 0.208 [0.976] 2.704  [0.259] 0.609 
DLDEBT_X 0.848 [0.838]          0.252  [0.882]               0.608 
                                       
 
 
 
 Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DLEMBI_CO -0.000       0.023        -0.510          3.737        0.061           -0.070 
DLDEBT_X 0.000 0.078 0.123 3.412       0.203           -0.202 
DLIMACO 0.000        0.125         0.045          4.314        0.415            -0.379 
DINF -0.000        0.156          0.250          3.082        0.456            -0.400 
  
 Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DLEMBI_CH 0.000         0.018 -0.148 3.244 0.049 -0.057 
DLIPI 0.000 0.027 -0.131 2.921 0.057 -0.073 
DINF -0.000 0.264 0.202 3.485 0.768 -0.673 
DLDEBT_X -0.000 0.087 0.014 2.597 0.201 -0.210 
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Table 5e. Mexico 
Tests for Autocorrelation and lag length determination                            
          
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(k) 
VAR(4) 4 102   17 773.042       -12.074     -13.116      0.189 
VAR(3) 3 102 13 748.491 -12.318     -13.115      0.002 
VAR(2) 2 102 9 714.167 -12.371     -12.922      0.000 
VAR(1) 1 102 5 693.836 -12.698     -13.004      0.003 
 
Univariate Statistics                                                 
                                                 
 ARCH(4)               Normality R-Squared 
DLEMBI_MX 8.903 [0.064]          3.879  [0.144]                 0.654 
DIAI 16.944 [0.002]          1.125  [0.570]                0.547 
DINF 11.197 [0.024] 2.921  [0.232] 0.558 
DLDEBT_X 7.688 [0.104] 3.403  [0.182] 0.409 
      
 
Table 5f. Ecuador 
Tests for Autocorrelation and lag length determination                            
          
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(k) 
VAR(2) 2 139 20 1978.853     -25.633    -26.635     0.081 
VAR(1) 1 139 16 1931.693     -25.522    -26.324     0.000 
 
Univariate Statistics                                                 
                                                 
 ARCH(2)               Normality R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_EC 9.820 [0.007]           12.068  [0.002]             0.741 
DLEAI 1.248 [0.536] 0.021  [0.990] 0.663 
DINF 2.059 [0.357]             0.065  [0.968]             0.775 
DLDEBT_X 4.122 [0.127]             2.100  [0.350]             0.469 
                                      
 
Table 5g. Panama 
Tests for Autocorrelation and lag length determination                            
          
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(k) 
VAR(2) 2 102 20 1039.011    -16.745    -17.970     0.589 
VAR(1) 1 102 16 1016.394    -17.027    -18.007     0.029 
 
Univariate Statistics                                                 
                                                 
 ARCH(2)               Normality R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_PANA 1.942 [0.379]          3.805  [0.149]               0.614 
DLEREV_C 0.118 [0.943]          1.647  [0.439]               0.745 
DINF 3.593 [0.166]          0.162  [0.922] 0.634 
DLDEBT_X 0.335 [0.846]          2.609  [0.271]               0.617 
  
 Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DLEMBI_MX -0.000 0.014   -0.375           3.625            0.038             -0.043 
DIAI -0.000 2.028 0.162           3.174            5.854             -5.179 
DINF 0.000 0.193              -0.336           2.706            0.390             -0.540 
DLDEBT_X 0.000 0.070               0.320           3.567            0.235             -0.146 
  
 Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_EC -0.000 0.046              -0.858             4.242           0.097              -0.164 
DLEAI 0.000 0.063                0.002            2.843            0.166             -0.144 
DINF 0.000 0.003                0.051            2.838             0.007            -0.006 
DLDEBT_X 0.000 0.073                0.330            3.110            0.225             -0.175 
  
 Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_PANA 0.000 0.017             -0.444              3.452          0.031               -0.058 
DLEREV_C -0.000 0.036             -0.143              3.307         0.091                -0.104 
DINF -0.000 0.349              0.006              2.946         0.832                -0.954 
DLDEBT_X 0.000 0.131             -0.358              3.283         0.285                -0.410 
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Table 6.Johansen tests                                                                                            
p-r r Eig.Value   Trace Trace* Frac95 P-value P-Value* p-r r Eig.Value   Trace Trace* Frac95 P-value P-Value* 
Table 6a.Argentina Table 6b.Brazil 
4 0 0.253 57.195    53.353 47.707 0.004 0.013 4 0 0.356 84.746 77.834  63.659     0.000 0.002 
3 1 0.124     26.531    25.002     29.804    0.117      0.166 3 1 0.226      39.058   36.872   42.770     0.115       0.178 
2 2 0.106     12.589    11.831     15.408    0.131      0.167 2 2   0.112      12.412   11.780   25.731     0.782       0.824 
1 3 0.007       0.781      0.714       3.841    0.377      0.398 1 3 0.001        0.114     0.110   12.448     1.000       1.000 
Table 6c.Colombia Table 6d.Chile 
4 0 0.263 51.127 49.007 47.707 0.022 0.037 4 0 0.271 52.125 49.204 47.707 0.017 0.035 
3 1 0.138 19.146 18.491 29.804 0.493 0.540 3 1 0.131 19.239 18.217 29.804 0.487 0.560 
2 2 0.029 3.502 3.242 15.408 0.932 0.947 2 2 0.037 4.696 4.139 15.408 0.837 0.886 
1 3 0.004 0.454 0.343 3.841 0.500 0.558 1 3 0.007 0.741 0.549 3.841 0.389 0.459 
Table 6e.Mexico Table 6f. Ecuador   
4 0 0.375 74.024 67.332 47.707 0.000 0.000 4 0 0.289 66.145 61.757 47.707 0.000 0.001 
3 1 0.141 25.549 23.741 29.804 0.147 0.219 3 1 0.195 29.970 28.117 29.804 0.048 0.078 
2 2 0.089 9.849 8.448 15.408 0.298 0.426 2 2 0.064 6.956 6.563 15.408 0.589 0.634 
1 3 0.003 0.303 0.283 3.841 0.582 0.595 1 3 0.000 0.001 0.001 3.841 0.970 0.972 
Table 6g. Panama    
4 0 0.323 83.576 79.508 47.707 0.000 0.000   
3 1 0.235 42.641 40.886 29.804 0.001 0.001   
2 2 0.128 14.546 13.868 15.408 0.068 0.086    
1 3 0.001 0.104 0.099 3.841 0.747 0.754    
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Table 7. Exclusion tests 
Table 7a.Argentina Table 7b.Brazil 
r DFG 5%CV LEMBI_M_ARG LEAI INF LDEBT_X r DFG 5%CV LEMBI_M_BRA LII INF LDEBT_X 
1 1 3.841           0.177  
[0.674]            
0.160 
[0.689] 
46.649 
[0.000] 
0.148 
[0.701] 
1 1 3.841 1.682 
[0.195] 
8.402 
[0.004] 
9.067 
[0.003] 
2.262 
[0.133] 
2 2 5.991 15.169 
[0.001] 
1.422 
[0.491] 
61.128 
[0.000] 
3.340 
[0.188] 
2 2 5.991 4.477 
[0.107] 
21.536 
[0.000] 
23.366 
[0.000] 
5.754 
[0.056] 
3 3 7.815 21.412 
[0.000] 
8.798 
[0.032] 
64.226 
[0.000] 
11.312 
[0.010] 
3 3 7.815 12.327 
[0.006] 
32.972 
[0.000] 
34.786 
[0.000] 
15.161 
[0.002] 
Table 7c.Colombia Table 7d.Chile 
r DFG 5%CV LEMBI_CO LIMACO INF LDEBT_X r DFG 5%CV LEMBI_CH LIPI INF LDEBT_X 
1 1 3.841           6.244 
[0.012] 
11.050 
[0.001] 
2.505 
[0.113] 
3.386 
[0.066] 
1 1 3.841   3.280 
 [0.070] 
10.785 
 [0.001] 
12.279 
[0.000] 
4.749 
[0.029] 
2 2 5.991 6.793 
[0.033] 
18.160 
[0.000] 
17.016 
[0.000] 
3.791 
[0.150] 
2 2 5.991 5.856 
 [0.053] 
16.712 
 [0.000] 
18.250 
[0.000] 
8.666 
[0.013] 
3 3 7.815 18.919 
[0.000] 
30.095 
[0.000] 
29.917 
[0.000] 
15.027 
[0.002] 
3 3 7.815  8.233 
 [0.041] 
19.840 
 [0.000] 
21.572 
 0.000] 
12.050 
[0.007] 
Table 7e.Mexico Table 7f.Ecuador 
r DFG 5%CV LEMBI_MX IAI INF LDEBT_X r DFG 5%CV LEMBI_M_EC LEAI INF LDEBT_X 
1 1 3.841           0.002 
[0.961] 
0.015 
[0.904] 
32.296 
[0.000] 
0.726 
[0.394] 
1 1 3.841           1.391 
[0.238] 
0.019 
[0.891] 
32.046 
[0.000] 
0.176 
[0.675] 
2 2 5.991  1.885 
 [0.390] 
0.048 
 [0.976] 
38.251 
 [0.000] 
4.239 
[0.120] 
2 2 5.991 1.429 
[0.490] 
10.899 
[0.004] 
40.450 
[0.000] 
9.598 
[0.008] 
3 3 7.815 9.470 
 [0.024] 
8.479 
 [0.037] 
47.469 
 [0.000] 
13.480 
[0.004] 
3 3 7.815 10.337 
[0.016] 
20.355 
[0.000] 
47.864 
[0.000] 
15.872 
[0.001] 
Table 7g. Panama   
r DFG 5%CV LEMBI_PANA IREV_C INF LDEBT_X   
1 1 3.841           1.318 
[0.251] 
2.971 
[0.085] 
11.776 
[0.001] 
10.982 
[0.001] 
  
2 2 5.991 11.760 
[0.003] 
13.278 
[0.001] 
20.549 
[0.000] 
15.019 
[0.001] 
  
3 3 7.815 25.313 
[0.000] 
25.599 
[0.000] 
34.818 
[0.000] 
29.224 
[0.001] 
   
Note: LR-test, Chi-Square(r), P-values in brackets. 
 
 
Table 8. Long run relationships 
Country   
 
CI(1) CI(2) 
Argentina Inf  
Brazil Lii - 0.18221*Inf + 0.1918*LDebt_X  
Colombia LEmbi_co – 1.0232*LIMACO – 2.4449*Inf  
Chile LEmbi_ch + 0.07898*LDebt_X – 0.2549*Inf  
Mexico Inf   
Ecuador Inf  
Panama -0.79176*Lrev_c +LEmbi_pana 0.61532*Inf +LDebt_X – 0.44483*LRev_c 
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Annex 4. Results 
Table 9. Econometric Results 
 
  Table 9a. Argentina 
Variable                      Equation                         
Equation 
DLEmbi_arg DLeai Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_arg_1 0.4745 
(0.0729) 
[6.51] 
0.055 
(0.0178) 
[3.11] 
0.0650 
(0.2797) 
[0.233] 
-0.2536 
(0.084) 
[-3.02] 
DLeai_1 0.2267 
(0.4613) 
[0.492] 
-0.0911 
(0.1127) 
[-0.809] 
1.5977 
(1.769) 
[0.903] 
0.386 
(0.5317) 
[0.727] 
Dinf_1 -0.00607 
(0.0142) 
[-0.426] 
-0.0024 
(0.0034) 
[-0.697] 
-0.1776 
(0.054) 
[-3.35] 
0.0097 
(0.0164) 
[0.593] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.1185 
(0.0876) 
[1.40] 
0.0264 
(0.0207) 
[1.28] 
-0.3997 
(0.3251) 
[-1.23] 
-0.1450 
(0.097) 
[-1.48] 
CI(1)_1* 0.00036 
(0.0111) 
[0.0329] 
0.00144 
(0.00272) 
[0.531] 
-0.3642 
(0.0427) 
[-8.53] 
-0.0088 
(0.0128) 
[-0.69] 
Dum0111p -0.2780 
(0.0689) 
[-4.03] 
-0.0154 
(0.01683) 
[-0.917] 
-0.1857 
(0.2643) 
[-0.703] 
-0.0372 
(0.079) 
[-0.469] 
Dum0202p 0.0959 
(0.07146) 
[1.34] 
0.0027 
(0.0174) 
[0.155] 
1.2090 
(0.2740) 
[4.41] 
-0.0299 
(0.082) 
[-0.364] 
Dum0204p -0.0425 
(0.0707) 
[-0.602] 
0.022 
(0.01728) 
[1.30] 
3.9607 
(0.2713) 
[14.6] 
0.0106 
(0.081) 
[0.13] 
Dum0504p -0.1002 
(0.0694) 
[-1.44] 
0.0100 
(0.0169) 
[0.595] 
-0.5195 
(0.2663) 
[-1.95] 
-0.409 
(0.080) 
[-5.12] 
Dum0810p -0.4681 
(0.0688) 
[-6.80] 
0.0077 
(0.01682) 
[0.459] 
0.0541 
(0.2641) 
[0.205] 
0.073 
(0.079) 
[0.92] 
  Notes: Std-Errors are in parenthesis and t-values in brackets. *Argentina: CI(1)= Inf. 
    
   Table 9b. Brazil 
Variable                     Equation       
Equation                         Equation 
DLEmbi_br DLii Dinf DLDebt__X 
DLEmbi_br_1 0.2413 
(0.0968) 
[2.49] 
-0.3561 
(0.1317) 
[-2.70] 
-0.3595 
(0.3619) 
[-0.993] 
0.6114 
(0.2537) 
[2.41] 
DLEmbi_br_2 -0.0300 
(0.0993) 
[-0.303] 
0.1743 
(0.1352) 
[1.29] 
-0.4834 
(0.3714) 
[-1.30] 
0.1667 
(0.2604) 
[0.640] 
DLii_1 0.1173 
(0.0988) 
[1.19] 
-0.0219 
(0.1345) 
[-0.163] 
-1.206 
(0.3696) 
[-3.26] 
-0.7832 
(0.2591) 
[-3.02] 
DLii_2 0.0645 
(0.0899) 
[0.718] 
0.4152 
(0.1224) 
[3.39] 
-0.3957 
(0.3363) 
[-1.18] 
-0.9867 
(0.2358) 
[-4.19] 
Dinf_1 -0.0212 
(0.0225) 
[-0.942] 
-0.0352 
(0.0307) 
[-1.15] 
-0.2212 
(0.0843) 
[-2.62] 
0.03738 
(0.0591) 
[0.632] 
Dinf_2 0.0392 
(0.0208) 
[1.89] 
-0.0917 
(0.0282) 
[-3.25] 
-0.1435 
(0.0777) 
[-1.85] 
0.0879 
(0.0545) 
[1.61] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.0171 
(0.0451) 
[0.379] 
-0.0441 
(0.0614) 
[-0.719] 
-0.0632 
(0.1688) 
[-0.375] 
-0.4393 
(0.1183) 
[-3.71] 
DLDebt_X_2 0.0655 
(0.0444) 
[1.48] 
0.0508 
(0.0604) 
[0.841] 
0.0320 
(0.1662) 
[0.193] 
-0.2745 
(0.1165) 
[-2.36] 
CI (1)_1* -0.0612 
(0.074) 
[-0.819] 
-0.4247 
(0.1018) 
[-4.17] 
1.104 
(0.2797) 
[3.95] 
0.6363 
(0.1961) 
[3.25] 
Dum0211p 0.1891 
(0.0453) 
[4.17] 
-0.0553 
(0.0617) 
[-0.898] 
1.1154 
(0.1696) 
[6.58] 
0.2762 
(0.1189) 
[2.32] 
Dum0810p -0.1312 
(0.0433) 
[-3.03] 
0.0228 
(0.0589) 
[0.387] 
0.0279 
(0.1621) 
[0.172] 
0.0769 
(0.1137) 
[0.677] 
  Notes: Std-Errors are in parenthesis and t-values in brackets.*Brazil:  CI(1)= Lii - 0.18221*Inf +  0.1918*LDebt_X 
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Table 9c. Colombia 
Variable                     Equation                          DLEmbi_co DLIMACO Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_co_1 0.1520 
(0.095) 
[1.60] 
1.1126 
(0.5134) 
[2.17] 
-1.15585 
(0.7058) 
[-1.64] 
-0.4547 
(0.3327) 
[-1.37] 
DLIMACO_1 -0.01669 
(0.008016) 
[-2.08] 
-0.5392 
(0.0433) 
[-12.5] 
0.037718 
(0.05953) 
[0.634] 
-0.02614 
(0.02806) 
[-0.932] 
Dinf_1 0.01621 
(0.01507) 
[1.08] 
0.1390 
(0.06141) 
[1.71] 
-0.184651 
(0.1119) 
[-1.65] 
-0.03471 
(0.0527) 
[-0.658] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.01487 
(0.02810) 
[0.501] 
-0.3494 
(0.1518) 
[-2.30] 
-0.097537 
(0.2087) 
[-0.467] 
-0.4635 
(0.09839) 
[-4.71] 
CI(1)_1* -0.00061 
(0.00306) 
[-0.202] 
0.1247 
(0.01655) 
[7.54] 
0.03288 
(0.02275) 
[1.45] 
-0.005683 
(0.01072) 
[-0.53] 
Dum0405p -0.1057 
(0.02889) 
[-3.66] 
0.02470 
(0.1561) 
[0.158] 
0.16086 
(0.2145) 
[0.75] 
0.00572 
(0.1011) 
[0.0566] 
Dum0810p -0.1548 
(0.03011) 
[-5.14] 
-0.3675 
(0.1626) 
[-2.26] 
0.5895 
(0.2236) 
[2.64] 
0.028015 
(0.1054) 
[0.266] 
Dum0901p -0.00769 
(0.030) 
[-0.255] 
-0.8094 
(0.1631) 
[-4.96] 
-0.1852 
(0.2243) 
[-0.826] 
0.1348 
(0.1057) 
[1.28] 
Dum0904p 0.02359 
(0.02929) 
[0.805] 
-1.4419 
(0.1582) 
[-9.11] 
-0.02224 
(0.2175) 
[-0.102] 
0.1485 
(0.1025) 
[1.45] 
Dum0907p -0.01486 
(0.03016) 
[-0.493] 
-2.3418 
(0.1629) 
[-14.4] 
0.15916 
(0.2240) 
[0.711] 
0.00464 
(0.1056) 
[0.0440] 
   Notes: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Colombia: CI (1)= LEMBI_co – 1.0232*LIMACO – 2.4449*Inf. 
    
 
Table 9d. Chile 
Variable                     Equation                          DLEmbi_ch DLipi Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_ch_1 0.2574 
(0.0855) 
[3.01] 
0.2394 
(0.1278) 
[1.87]** 
-0.0509 
(1.294) 
[-0.039] 
-0.8188 
(0.4075) 
[-2.01] 
DLEmbi_ch_2 -0.2627 
(0.08522) 
[-3.08] 
-0.077 
(0.1274) 
[-0.611] 
3.3522 
(1.29) 
[2.60] 
-0.5122 
(0.4061) 
[-1.26] 
DLipi_1 -0.04337 
(0.06672) 
[-0.650] 
-0.3102 
(0.099) 
[-3.11] 
-0.8168 
(1.010) 
[-0.809] 
0.0184 
(0.3179) 
[0.0582] 
DLipi_2 0.0069 
(0.0635) 
[0.109] 
-0.02408 
(0.09504) 
[-0.253] 
-2.6025 
(0.9622) 
[-2.70] 
-0.153 
(0.3030) 
[-0.508] 
Dinf_1 -0.0024 
(0.0068) 
[-0.362] 
-0.0049 
(0.010) 
[-0.481] 
-0.2602 
(0.1042) 
[-2.50] 
-0.054 
(0.03281) 
[-1.65] 
Dinf_2 -0.001122 
(0.0067) 
[-0.166] 
0.006 
(0.01011) 
[0.665] 
-0.3613 
(0.1023) 
[-3.53] 
-0.0704 
(0.03222) 
[-2.19] 
DLDebt_X_1 -0.0069 
(0.02465) 
[-0.280] 
-0.0200 
(0.0368) 
[-0.545] 
-0.1078 
(0.3731) 
[-0.289] 
-0.6481 
(0.1175) 
[-5.52] 
DLDebt_X_2 -0.0063 
(0.0244) 
[-0.261] 
0.03496 
(0.0364) 
[0.959] 
-0.1842 
(0.3692) 
[-0.499] 
-0.3492 
(0.1163) 
[-3.00] 
CI(1)_1* -0.007875 
(0.0080) 
[-0.976] 
0.0018 
(0.0120) 
[0.155] 
0.0939 
(0.1222) 
[0.769] 
-0.0318 
(0.0384) 
[-0.829] 
Dum0405p -0.0995 
(0.02314) 
[-4.30] 
-0.0123 
(0.0345) 
[-0.357] 
0.0668 
(0.3502) 
[0.191] 
-0.0393 
(0.110) 
[-0.356] 
Dum0810p -0.1611 
(0.02433) 
[-6.62] 
-0.01164 
(0.0363) 
[-0.320] 
0.0174 
(0.3682) 
[0.0473] 
0.1631 
(0.1159) 
[1.41] 
Dum0901p -0.0058 
(0.02565) 
[-0.227] 
-0.2303 
(0.0383) 
[-6.01] 
-0.5219 
(0.3881) 
[-1.34] 
0.1623 
(0.1222) 
[1.33] 
Notes: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Chile: C(1)= LEMBI_ch + 0.07898*LDebt_X – 0.2549*Inf . 
**When non-significant dummies were excluded this coefficient becomes significant.  
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Table 9e . Mexico 
Variable                      Equation                          DLEmbi_mx Diai Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_mx_1 0.1148 
(0.0752) 
[1.53] 
0.9876 
(11.12) 
[0.0888] 
-3.0817 
(1.039) 
[-2.97] 
-0.5085 
(0.3859) 
[-1.32] 
DLEmbi_mx_2 -0.4156 
(0.0714) 
[-5.82] 
10.1342 
(10.56) 
[0.960] 
0.8405 
(0.9866) 
[0.852] 
-0.4222 
(0.3665) 
[-1.15] 
DLEmbi_mx_3 0.0448 
(0.0774) 
[0.580] 
29.4665 
(11.45) 
[2.57] 
-0.8210 
(1.069) 
[-0.768] 
-1.5534 
(0.3973) 
[-3.91] 
DLiai_1 -0.0004 
(0.0006) 
[-0.679] 
-0.8000 
(0.1026) 
[-7.80] 
0.0213 
(0.0095) 
[2.22] 
0.0046 
(0.0035) 
[1.30] 
DLiai_2 0.0004 
(0.0008) 
[0.602] 
-0.5716 
(0.1198) 
[-4.77] 
0.0207 
(0.0111) 
[1.86] 
0.0027 
(0.0041) 
[0.663] 
DLiai_3 0.0001 
(0.0006) 
[0.242] 
-0.3033 
(0.1031) 
[2.94] 
0.0079 
(0.0096) 
[0.82] 
-0.0017 
(0.0035) 
[-0.486] 
Dinf_1 -0.0070 
(0.0098) 
[-0.716] 
1.0485 
(1.452) 
[0.722] 
0.3456 
(0.1356) 
[2.55] 
[1.34] 
-0.1244 
(0.0503) 
[-2.47] 
Dinf_2 0.0132 
(0.0088) 
[1.49] 
-0.9278 
(1.315) 
[-0.706] 
0.2636 
(0.1228) 
[2.15] 
-0.0649 
(0.0456) 
[-1.42] 
Dinf_3 0.0017 
(0.0070) 
[0.252] 
0.4255 
(1.045) 
[0.407] 
0.2831 
(0.0975) 
[2.90] 
0.0252 
(0.0362) 
[0.696] 
DLDebt_X_1 -0.0080 
(0.0203) 
[-0.393] 
-4.9697 
(3.009) 
[-1.65] 
0.2667 
(0.2811) 
[0.949] 
-0.2910 
(0.1044) 
[-2.79] 
DLDebt_X_2 0.0114 
(0.0214) 
[0.533] 
-6.9052 
(3.165) 
[-2.18] 
1.3002 
(0.2957) 
[4.40] 
0.0324 
(0.1098) 
[0.296] 
DLDebt_X_3 0.0293 
(0.0214) 
[1.37] 
-11.0014 
(3.165) 
[-3.48] 
0.0677 
(0.2957) 
[0.229] 
0.1342 
(0.1099) 
[1.22] 
CI(1)_1* 0.0003 
(0.0112) 
[0.0270] 
1.4923 
(1.661) 
[0.898] 
-0.9421 
(0.1552) 
[-6.07] 
0.1206 
(0.0576) 
[2.09] 
Dum0810p -0.1394 
(0.0161) 
[-8.66] 
-0.5771 
(2.379) 
[-0.243] 
0.0734 
(0.2223) 
[0.331] 
-0.0255 
(0.0825) 
[-0.309] 
Dum0405p -0.0605 
(0.0164) 
[-3.68] 
-2.3491 
(2.431) 
[-0.966] 
-0.1993 
(0.2271) 
[-0.878] 
-0.0531 
(0.0843) 
[-0.630] 
  Notes: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Mexico: C(1) = Inf. 
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Table 9f. Ecuador 
Variable                           Equation                          DLEmbi_ec DLeai Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_ec_1 0.2528 
(0.072) 
[3.50] 
-0.086 
(0.1061) 
[-0.819] 
-0.0027 
(0.0039) 
[-0.700] 
-0.2698 
(0.1149) 
[-2.35] 
DLeai_1 -0.031 
(0.0604) 
[-0.527] 
-0.6107 
(0.088) 
[-6.88] 
-0.0080 
(0.0033) 
[-2.42] 
0.0937 
(0.096) 
[0.0976] 
Dinf_1 1.0619 
(1.017) 
[1.04] 
-0.1161 
(1.493) 
[-0.077] 
-0.1312 
(0.055) 
[-2.35] 
-1.504 
(1.616) 
[-0.931] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.125 
(0.0613) 
[2.04] 
-0.0820 
(0.089) 
[-0.911] 
0.0009 
(0.0033) 
[0.273] 
-0.2481 
(0.097) 
[-2.55] 
CI(1)_1* -0.6925 
(1.073) 
[-0.645] 
0.0627 
(1.575) 
[0.0399] 
-0.4235 
(0.059) 
[-7.17] 
-0.7155 
(1.705) 
[-0.42] 
Dum0109p 0.0125 
(0.0569) 
[0.221] 
0.0596 
(0.083) 
[0.714] 
0.013 
(0.0031) 
[4.22] 
-0.089 
(0.09) 
[-0.987] 
Dum0301p 0.083 
(0.056) 
[1.46] 
0.0077 
(0.083) 
[0.0931] 
0.017 
(0.0031) 
[5.43] 
0.0109 
(0.09) 
[0.121] 
Dum0810p -0.4618 
(0.058) 
[-7.93] 
-0.1432 
(0.0854) 
[-1.68] 
-0.0047 
(0.0032) 
[-1.49] 
0.200 
(0.092) 
[2.16] 
Dum0811p -0.4984 
(0.065) 
[-7.62] 
-0.0083 
(0.096) 
[-0.08] 
-0.0071 
(0.0035) 
[-1.97] 
0.0721 
(0.1039) 
[0.69] 
Dum0906p 0.1389 
(0.056) 
[2.46] 
-0.0377 
(0.082) 
[-0.455] 
-0.0007 
(0.0031) 
[-0.257] 
-0.410 
(0.089) 
[-4.92] 
   Note: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Ecuador: CI(1)= Inf_1. 
    
    
Table 9g. Panama 
Variable                           Equation                          DLEmbi_pa 
 
DLrev_c Dinf 
 
DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_pa_1 0.2995 
(0.074) 
[4.00] 
0.04671 
(0.1630) 
[0.287] 
3.8661 
(1.595) 
[2.42] 
-0.4881 
(0.6171) 
[-0.791] 
DLrev_c_1 -0.0387 
(0.0456) 
[-0.849] 
-0.1722 
(0.0992) 
[-1.74] 
0.7122 
(0.9714) 
[0.733] 
0.1170 
(0.3757) 
[0.311] 
Dinf_1 -0.0058 
(0.0043) 
[-1.33] 
-0.0228 
(0.0095) 
[-2.40] 
-0.2284 
(0.093) 
[-2.45] 
0.0769 
(0.036) 
[2.14] 
DLDebt_X_1 -0.00147 
(0.01302) 
[-0.113] 
0.0337 
(0.02832) 
[1.19] 
0.6640 
(0.2772) 
[2.40] 
-0.0085 
(0.1072) 
[-0.919] 
CI(1)_1* -0.0988 
(0.028) 
[-3.51] 
0.1816 
(0.0612) 
[2.97] 
-0.0633 
(0.5992) 
[-0.106] 
-0.1927 
(0.2318) 
[-0.832] 
CI(2)_1* 0.0067 
(0.0092) 
[0.737] 
0.00694 
(0.0200) 
[0.346] 
-0.9952 
(0.1964) 
[-5.07] 
-0.2118 
(0.0759) 
[-2.79] 
Dum0401p 0.02503 
(0.02011) 
[1.25] 
-0.00535 
(0.0437) 
[-0.122] 
-1.9271 
(0.4283) 
[-4.50] 
0.3987 
(0.1656) 
[2.41] 
Dum0810p -0.1819 
(0.0202) 
[-8.99] 
0.0221 
(0.044) 
[0.0502] 
-0.4506 
(0.4310) 
[-1.05] 
0.1666 
(0.1667) 
[1.00] 
Note: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Panama: CI(1)= -0.79176*Lrev_c +LEmbi_pana and 
CI(2)=0.61532*Inf +LDebt_X – 0.44483*LRev_c 
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Table 10. Comparative analysis taking only the significant coefficients into account 
  
Note: The results shown are the ones obtained when non-significant dummies were eliminated.  CI(): Specifies only the variables 
included in each long run relationship, which are described in Table 8. *This variable changes depending on the country (see Table 
4). **When non-significant dummies were excluded this coefficient becomes significant.  
Variable Argentinaa Brazil Colombia Chile Mexico Ecuador Panama  
Dependent variable:  DLEMBI_specific_country  
DLEMBI X X  X X X X  
DLEAI   X      
DINF         
DLDEBT_X      X   
DUM0810 X X X X X X X  
DUM0405   X X X    
DUM0211  X       
CI()     X  X(CI1) 
(CI(1)) 
 
Dependent variable:  DLEAI
*
   
DLEMBI X X X     X(**) X    
DLEAI  X X X X X   
DINF  X     X  
DDEBT_X   X  X    
DUM0810   X      
DUM0901   X X     
CI()  X X    X(CI1)  
Dependent variable:  DINF   X    X (CI_1) 
DLEMBI    X X  X  
DLEAI  X  X X X   
DINF X X  X X X X  
DLDEBT_X     X  X  
DUM0810   X      
CI() X X    X  X X(CI2) 
(CI(2)) 
 
Dependent variable:  DLDEBT_X  
DLEMBI X X  X X X   
DLEAI  X       
DINF    X X  X  
DLDEBT_X  X X X X X   
DUM0211  X       
DUM0810      X   
CI()  X   X  X(CI2) 
(CI(2)) 
 
  
